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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A stranger to the town watched from afar as deputies led a heavy-hearted young 
woman from the courthouse.  A peculiar symbol, bold and scarlet, drew attention 
from her reddened cheeks as she started to leave the scene.  The stranger asked a 
man in the crowd what the colored symbol meant.  “The symbol denotes her guilt,” 
the man said sardonically.  “It is a badge of shame for her crime against decency and 
the community.”  
Perplexed, the stranger wondered if all criminals in the town were doomed to a 
similar fate.  Did thieves have to wear blue?  Did murderers have to wear green?  
“No.”  The man said, “This is for her crime only.” 
The stranger’s curiosity continued to grow and a sense of injustice rose to the 
surface as he blurted out, “What could the poor girl have done to deserve this public 
admonishment?”  
“Hester Prynne,” the man said, “was convicted of drinking and driving.”  
As the stranger watched Hester drive off, his eyes focused on her bright yellow 
license plate with the scarlet letters.  He asked the man, “How familiar with the 
young girl are you?”  
“I have never spoken to her,” the man said.  “Her license plate told me 
everything I need to know.” 
The stigma of the scarlet letter is no mere vestige of Puritan society.  It is also 
reborn in modern criminal statutes.  The scarlet “A” for adultery, which Hester 
Prynne was forced to wear in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s classic novel,1 has given way 
to the yellow license plate with scarlet letters Ohio’s legislature requires for OVI 
offenders.  Surprisingly, Ohio’s special license plate has faced little opposition, 
presumably because of the state’s interest in preserving highway safety.  But when a 
statute forces someone to exhibit a particular message or ideology, First Amendment 
issues are necessarily raised.  This Note will make a simple claim: Ohio’s statute that 
requires special license plates for OVI offenders compels speech and cannot pass 
strict scrutiny. 
                                                          
 1 Hawthorne explores the use of shame to punish immorality in Puritan culture. The 
novel’s heroine, Hester Prynne, is forced to wear the letter “A” on her breast signifying her 
adultery. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 50 (Bantam Dell 2003) (1850). 
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Part II will briefly examine the history of scarlet letter punishments.  These types 
of sanctions raise many constitutional concerns; this Note will specifically address 
First Amendment compelled speech.  Different standards of constitutional review for 
First Amendment violations and probation conditions will also be discussed.   
Part III will explain how Ohio’s special license plate violates the First 
Amendment.  Because the license plate is a legislative requirement that infringes 
upon free speech and eliminates judicial sentencing discretion, the state’s interest 
must pass strict scrutiny.2  This analysis will confirm that the state’s interest is 
legitimate but not compelling.  The special license plate fails to effectively deter and 
its efforts to identify offenders is counterproductive.  The special license plate also 
fails to meet the goals of Ohio probation: rehabilitation and reformation.  
Additionally, there are less burdensome and more effective means of meeting the 
government’s valid goals. 
Part IV will conclude that these other means should replace the special license 
plate as a probation condition for OVI offenders.   
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Scarlet Letter Punishment 
Scarlet Letter sanctions force the perpetrator to publicly admit to a crime in an 
attempt to elicit shame.3 Shame, therefore, is used as a vehicle for compliance with 
the law.  The resort to shaming as a criminal sanction can be traced back hundreds of 
years.4   
A recurring feature throughout the history of shaming has been legislative 
enactments to distinguish people by forcing them to wear a specific color or symbol.  
In 1233, Pope Gregory IX forced Cathars who were convicted of heresy to wear a 
yellow cross as a badge of shame.5  In England, under the Poor Law Act of 1697, 
people receiving parish relief were required to wear a badge of blue or red cloth in an 
open and visible manner as a means to deter others.6  In the nineteenth century, 
prisoners in New York were forced to wear striped uniforms.  These uniforms were 
eventually abolished for having the undesirable effect of shaming prisoners.7  In the 
twentieth century, Nazi concentration camps used color-coded badges of shame to 
                                                          
 2 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); see generally United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).  But see, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 
(2010) (showing that the Court applied intermediate scrutiny to compelled speech but has 
limited its application to compelled disclosure in the electoral context). 
 3  DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 48 (1971). 
 4 Id. 
 5 EAMON DUFFY, FAITH OF OUR FATHERS: REFLECTIONS ON CATHOLIC TRADITIONS 159 
(2006).  
 6 Steve Hindle, Dependency, Shame and Belonging: Branding the Deserving Poor, c. 
1550-1750, 1 CULTURAL & SOC. HIST.  5, 13 (2004). 
 7 See JOHN CLARK PRATT, PUNISHMENT AND CIVILIZATION: PENAL TOLERANCE AND 
INTOLERANCE IN MODERN SOCIETY 76 (2006). “The distinctive prison stripes were abolished in 
1904. . . . stripes had come to be looked upon as a badge of shame and were a constant 
humiliation and irritant to many prisoners.” 
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classify prisoners according to the reason for their detention.8  Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, however, has noted: 
It is not only under Nazi rule that police excesses are inimical to freedom.  
It is easy to make light of insistence of scrupulous regard for the 
safeguards of civil liberties when invoked on behalf of the unworthy . . . 
history bears testimony that by such disregard are the rights of liberty 
extinguished, heedlessly, at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end.9 
As history has indicated, certain colors do more than just distinguish the person 
from the rest of society.  Colors carry specific connotations and associations.  It is 
not the colors themselves that have meaning; society has assigned cultural meanings 
to them.  When a statute forces a person to wear a certain color, it forces that person 
to carry the message the legislature wishes to promulgate.10  The color compels the 
person to speak that message.   
B.  Ohio’s Special License Plate 
In 1967, Ohio first made special colored license plates available for judges to 
give to OVI offenders.11  Judges rarely used these special license plates,12 and so in 
2004, Ohio passed legislation that made these plates mandatory for certain 
offenders.13  Under the Ohio Revised Code, if a person has been convicted of a 
“high-tier” OVI offense or multiple OVI offenses within six years, the driver must 
have special license plates for the term of the license suspension.14  Additionally, the 
code provides that no person operating a motor vehicle displaying special license 
plates shall knowingly disguise or obscure its color.15  A person who does so is 
                                                          
 8 PETER HAYES, LESSONS AND LEGACIES 53 (1991); see also Dorthe Seifert, Between 
Silence and License: The Representation of the National Socialist Persecution of 
Homosexuality in Anglo-American Fiction and Film, 15 HIST. & MEMORY 94, 99 (2003) 
(explaining that the pink triangle had been the designation for homosexual concentration camp 
inmates incarcerated under Paragraph 175 of the German Penal Code).  
 9 Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 10 See generally Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1172 (explaining 
that wearing of certain clothing can constitute “speech” and implicate the First Amendment); 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that requiring a person to have a 
license plate with a certain motto forces that person to profess that message).  
 11 Gerri L. Elder, Ohio Judges Violate DUI Law, TOTALDUI.COM 
http://www.totaldui.com/news/articles/legislation/ohio-dui-law-violations.aspx (last visited 
October 5, 2011). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4503.231(A) (West 2010).  
 14  A “high-tier” OVI offense occurs when a perpetrator’s blood alcohol content is 0.17 or 
higher. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(A)(1)(f) (West 2010). 
 15 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4503.231(A) (West 2010). 
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guilty of a misdemeanor.16  Much like the scarlet letter punishments of the past, these 
license plates carry a stigma and force the offender to carry an ideological message.17 
C.  The First Amendment and Compelled Speech 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States declares that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”18  It “reflects 
vital attributes of the American character and is the cornerstone of the nation’s 
liberty.”19  Liberty is not only protected by the freedom to express speech, it is also 
protected by the freedom to express nothing at all.  The compulsion to speak chips 
away at the nation’s cornerstone just as the repression of speech may.20   
The Supreme Court first addressed compelled speech in 1943.  In West Virginia 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,21 the state Board of Education adopted a resolution 
requiring all children in public schools to salute the flag and recite the pledge of 
allegiance.22  Failure to comply was considered “insubordination” and those students 
would be expelled.23  Readmission was denied by statute until the student 
complied.24  This expulsion, in turn, automatically exposed the child and their 
parents to criminal prosecution.25  
The Barnettes brought suit to enjoin the Board of Education from enforcing the 
requirement.26 They argued that compelling school children to salute the flag and 
recite the pledge of the allegiance was an unconstitutional infringement on the First 
Amendment.27  The Court found in favor of the Barnettes.28 The Court explained that 
the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking were both a part of the First 
Amendment.29  The Court concluded, “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
                                                          
 16 Id. 
 17 See Phaedra Athena O’Hara Kelly, The Ideology of Shame: An Analysis of the First 
Amendment and Eighth Amendment Challenges to Scarlet-Letter Probation Conditions, 77 
N.C. L. REV. 783 (1999). O’Hara Kelly argues that shame is an ideology and is sufficient to 
raise First Amendment concerns in the context of probation conditions. 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 19 KERMIT L. HALL, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 536 (Kermit L. Hall et al. 2nd ed. 2005). 
 20 See generally Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (holding that for 
purposes of the First Amendment the right to speak and the right not to speak will be treated 
the same). 
 21 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 22 Id. at 628.  
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 629. 
 26 Id. at 630. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 640. 
 29  Id. at 633-34. 
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constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox 
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.”30 
Compelled speech law continued to evolve, and in 1969, the Court decided 
Wooley v. Maynard.31  The case resulted from a New Hampshire statute that required 
all noncommercial vehicles to bear license plates with the state motto, “Live Free or 
Die.”32  Much like the current Ohio statute, New Hampshire’s statute provided that 
anyone who knowingly obscured the figures or letters on a license plate would be 
guilty of a misdemeanor.33  
Maynard was a Jehovah’s Witness and considered the New Hampshire State 
motto to be repugnant to his beliefs.34  He attempted to obstruct the motto and was 
cited for violating the statute on three separate occasions.35  Maynard argued that the 
license plate was a violation of his First Amendment rights and forced him to 
proclaim an ideological message on his car.36  The Court agreed with Maynard.  It 
held that by requiring the vehicles to bear that motto, every driver was forced to 
carry the message of the license plate.37  The New Hampshire statute, therefore, 
compelled speech.38 
D.  Standards of Review 
In United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., the Supreme Court first introduced the 
notion that different standards of review should be applied to certain constitutional 
issues.39  To the particular issue of the case, the Court applied minimal scrutiny,40 
more commonly known as rational basis review.  It also recognized, however, that 
other circumstances will inevitably require a heightened standard.41  In what is 
considered by many to be the most significant footnote in constitutional law,42 the 
                                                          
 30 Id. at 642. 
 31 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 708. 
 35 Id. at 709. 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. at 715. 
 38 Id. 
 39 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938). 
 40 Id. at 152 (“[R]egulatory legislation . . . is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless 
in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to 
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and 
experience of the legislators.”). 
 41 Id. at 153. 
 42 See Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1093 (1982).  There has been considerable debate over who is the true author of the 
footnote. It is now recognized that the original draft was not fact written by Justice Stone, the 
author of the opinion.  Instead, Justice Stone’s clerk, Louis Lusky, penned the initial draft. 
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Court outlined a higher level of scrutiny that would become known as strict 
scrutiny.43  Most notably, the Court stated that there would be a heightened standard 
when “legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments . . .”44  
1.  Strict Scrutiny 
When a law infringes upon the First Amendment, it must pass the heightened 
standard of strict scrutiny to be upheld.45  Under strict scrutiny, a law is 
unconstitutional unless the state can justify it by a compelling state interest.46  The 
law must also be narrowly tailored and be the least restrictive means of achieving the 
compelling interest.47  Furthermore, in the context of compelled speech, the law must 
be the least “speech restrictive” means.48  In other words, there must be no less 
burdensome means on speech the state can use in attempting to achieve its interest.49  
Accordingly in Wooley, New Hampshire’s interest had to pass strict scrutiny.50  
The Court held that making vehicles more identifiable to law enforcement and 
promoting state pride did not pass constitutional muster.51  There were other ways 
for the government to achieve its interest that would not require the citizen to be a 
courier of an ideological message.52  The Court concluded, “even though the 
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued 
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be 
more narrowly achieved.”53  
                                                          
Lusky commented on the authorship of the footnote in his book. The book includes facsimiles 
of the original drafts, the first draft belonging to Lusky.  It seems that Stone edited the second 
draft and made subsequent changes.  Justice Stone was obviously very involved in the 
footnote but the original draft belongs to Lusky.  LOUIS LUSKY, OUR NINE TRIBUNES: THE 
SUPREME COURT IN MODERN AMERICA, 119-26 (1993).  
 43 Carolene, 304 U.S. at 153; see also 16A AM. JUR. 2D Const. L. § 403 (2010).   
 44 Carolene, 304 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added). 
 45 A fundamental right for the purposes of strict scrutiny is one that is guaranteed by a 
State or Federal Constitution. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Const. L. § 403, supra note 43. 
 46 See id.; see, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977). 
 47 See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Const. L. § 403, supra note 43. Narrowly tailored means that the 
law is as specific as it possibly can be to serve the given purpose. If a different law would do 
the same thing and impinge less on constitutional rights, the law will not pass the strict burden 
imposed by this standard.  
 48 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716. 
 49  Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 717. See also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 638 (1943) 
(explaining that that forcing students to salute the flag, and threatening them with expulsion if 
they chose not to, was a not a permissible way to foster national unity). 
 53 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716.  
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2.  Rational Basis Review 
Rational basis review tests whether a governmental action is a reasonable means 
to an end that may be legitimately pursued by the government.54  This standard of 
review requires that the governmental action be rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.55  In dealing with the constitutionality of criminal probation 
conditions, courts usually engage in rational basis review.56  In this analysis, if the 
probation condition reasonably relates to legitimate purposes of probation, it is 
upheld.57 In these cases, courts focus on the particular sanction’s relationship to 
probation and often overlook the individual’s rights.58  
These courts examine judicially crafted conditions, however, as opposed to 
statutory requirements.59  At least one Ohio court has gone so far as to recognize that 
the focus must be on the protection of the fundamental right, not the reasonableness 
of the probation.60  But when a statute implicates a fundamental right, even if the 







                                                          
 54 See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Const. L. § 403, supra note 43. 
 55 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).  
 56 See 21A AM. JUR. 2D Crim. L. § 849 (2010). 
 57 Id. 
 58 See Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding a 
probation condition requiring a DUI offender have a “Convicted DUI” bumper sticker on his 
car because it was reasonably related to probation); Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793, 799 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding a requirement that a convicted DUI felon to wear a 
fluorescent pink plastic bracelet bearing the words “DUI Convict.”).  But see People v. 
Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing a trial court order that 
forced a person convicted of shop lifting beer from wearing a tee shirt at all times announcing 
his crime and conviction).  
 59 See Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d  at 126; Ballenger, 436 S.E.2d at 799; Hackler, 16 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 687; Lindsey v. State, 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reviewing a 
judicially crafted probation condition requiring the offender to place and pay for a newspaper 
advertisement containing his mug shot and the caption “DUI—Convicted”); People v. 
Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (reviewing a probation condition requiring the 
offender to place an advertisement in a newspaper that included her mug shot and an apology 
for her crime.)  
 60 In re Miller, 611 N.E.2d 452, 453 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the state failed to 
demonstrate any compelling state interest in the probation condition at issue that the defendant 
could not dress in woman’s clothing or go certain places could justify limiting First 
Amendment freedoms). “The rights foreclosed by the trial court are fundamental rights and 
should not be encroached upon through the conditions imposed herein.” Id. 
 61 See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938); see 16A AM. JUR. 
2D Const L.§ 403  supra note 43. 
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III.  Discussion 
A.  Ohio’s Statute Compels Speech 
 The statute must be shown to violate free speech before it can be scrutinized.62  
The Supreme Court has held that in determining whether nonverbal communication 
is sufficient to implicate the First Amendment, there must be intent to convey a 
message and that message must be likely to be understood.63 The nature of the 
activity in combination with the factual context and environment can be used to 
determine whether communication is such that it requires protection.64  Ohio’s 
Scarlet Letter Statute fits such a bill.    
Drawing from the Court’s decision in Wooley,65 the state’s requirement of the 
license plate shows the requisite intent to convey a message.  In Wooley, the license 
plate had actual words,66 yet the idea is no different in this instance.  As discussed 
earlier, colors have profound connotations and societal meanings.67  The bright 
yellow license plate with scarlet letters is meant to make people aware that the driver 
has an OVI conviction.   The state’s lack of subtlety is emphasized through the 
brazen license plate.  Its message is obviously understood; otherwise its purpose 
would be thwarted.68  
A critic might argue that license plates can be distinguished from being forced to 
adorn certain clothing because a person is not forced to drive a car all day.  Courts 
have recognized, however, that while driving a vehicle is not a fundamental right, it 
has become a basic reality of everyday life.69  The necessity to give driving 
                                                          
 62 Once it is to be determined that such person’s interest implicate First Amendment 
protections, it must also be “determine[d] whether the state’s countervailing interest is 
sufficiently compelling to justify requiring the persons to display the motto on their license 
plates.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977). 
 63 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974).  
 64 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). “We cannot accept the view that an 
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging 
in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.” However, the nature and circumstances can 
be used to identify what constituted protected speech.  
 65 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717. 
 66 Id. at 707. New Hampshire required all noncommercial vehicles to bear license plates 
with the state motto “Live Free or Die.”  
 67 See supra Part II.A. See also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 364 (holding that 
the display of a red flag as a symbol of opposition to government was protected by the First 
Amendment); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). “The 
use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality is a short 
cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations, political parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups 
seek to knit the loyalty of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design.” 
 68  See infra Part III.C. The special license plate purports to make other members of 
society aware of the license plate as well as make the offender more easily identifiable to law 
enforcement. 
 69 Dep’t. of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Slater, 462 A.2d 870, 875 (Pa. Com. Pl. 
1983) “It is hard to accept the continued characterization of a license to drive as a privilege. 
No one will deny that we have reached a time in our modern way of life when the motor 
vehicle has clearly become a necessity to many people.”  However even with this realization 
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privileges for people with suspended licenses itself recognizes this.  Additionally, 
Wooley held that by requiring the vehicle to bear a motto, every driver was forced to 
carry the message of the license plate.70  First Amendment protection is tied to the 
individual, not the form or duration of intrusion.   
1.  Goldschmitt v. State 
At least one court has disagreed that a manifestation of a DUI conviction on a car 
is a form of communication.  That court, however, failed to apply precedent 
correctly.  In Goldschmitt v. State, the Florida Court of Appeals held that a judicially 
imposed “Convicted DUI” bumper sticker is not an ideological message and 
therefore did not infringe upon the individual’s First Amendment rights.71  The 
Goldschmitt court distinguished Wooley, on the grounds that the bumper sticker was 
not an ideological message but rather a form of penance and served as a warning to 
others.72  It is not apparent why the court would find that either a penance or a 
warning could not be considered speech.73  Moreover, it ignored whether the bumper 
sticker intended to communicate a message or whether the message would be 
understood.74  
Additionally, the Goldschmitt Court classified the issue in Wooley as “whether 
New Hampshire’s interest in broadcasting its state motto sufficiently overrode the 
defendant’s objection to the motto that criminal penalties could be imposed for the 
defacing of the tag.”75  To begin, the Wooley Court applied strict scrutiny and under 
this analysis there is no actual balancing of competing interests.76  Perhaps most 
importantly, the Wooley Court stated that the case did not present an issue of 
symbolic speech where Maynard was attempting to establish a right to deface the 
license plate.  Instead, it was a case of compelled speech.77  Maynard sought the right 
to drive without having to display the motto on the license plate, not the right to 
deface it.  This becomes clear when looking at Maynard’s prayer for relief in the 
                                                          
the court’s holding was that driving is a privilege because although it may be a prerequisite to 
employment, the United States Supreme Court has stated employment is not a fundamental 
right.  
 70 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.  
 71 Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
 72 Id. 
 73 In one of the most famous axioms concerning the First Amendment, Justice Holmes 
stated, “the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely 
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 
(1919).  While in this example the warning is not protected, it is clear that it constitutes 
speech.  
 74 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 417 (1964) (pointing out that “[v]irtually any 
law enacted by a state, when viewed with sufficient ingenuity, could be thought to interfere 
with some citizen’s preferred means of expression”). 
 75 Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 125. 
 76 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977). 
 77 Id. (citing the individual’s “right to avoid becoming the courier for the state’s 
message”). 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss4/10
2011] HAVE YOU BEEN DRINKING TONIGHT MS. PRYNNE? 755 
 
District Court.   Maynard asked for a license plate that did not have the motto, and 
did not seek the right to cover the license plate motto.78  This undermines the very 
premise of the Goldschmitt Court.    
2.  What is the Special License Plate’s Message? 
The Supreme Court has noted that while scarlet letter probation conditions may 
implicate the First Amendment, they are “less embarrassing and onerous” than the 
maximum jail sentence.79  Nevertheless, the First Amendment should not be 
haphazardly infringed upon because courts find such infringement less cumbersome 
than the penitentiary.   
Moreover, empirical research has begun to show that people with these licenses 
plates are forced to carry a message more burdensome than a simple admission of 
guilt.  In recent studies, researchers concluded that repeat DUI offenders might have 
reasoning deficits.80  Under the Ohio Statute, repeat DUI offenders are most 
commonly burdened with the restricted license plates.81  In one study, researchers 
found that second-time DUI offenders have a poorer performance on the Iowa 
Gambling Test82 (“IGT”) than their matched counterparts.83  The IGT test is a series 
of psychological tests to simulate real life decision-making.84  In another study, 
researchers concluded that second-time DUI offenders suffer from cognitive 
impulsiveness, which involves associating negative experiences with possible 
negative consequences.85  In other words, “There are brain reasons for why people 
make poor choices regarding DUI.”86  
Another report confirmed that DUI offenders have personality and attitude 
differences when compared to all other drivers.87  Offenders are frequently more 
                                                          
 78 Id. at 713 n. 10. 
 79  Blanton v. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 544 (1989).  The Supreme Court also noted that 
the probation condition did not describe when and where the clothing must be worn.  
 80 Robert Preidt, Repeat DUI Offenders Have Reasoning Deficits: Study, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Sep. 8, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/lifestyle/content/healthday/ 
642825.html. 
 81 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4510.13(A)(7) and 4511.19(G)(1)(b), (c), (d), (e) (West 2010) 
(requiring special license plates only for repeat offenders, unless blood alcohol level at first 
offense is .17% or more). 
 82 The Iowa gambling task (IGT) tests the impairment of decision-making processes, 
especially adaptive sensitivity to future consequences.  See Antoine Bechara et al., Emotion, 
Decision-Making, and the Orbitofrontal Cortex, 10 CEREBRAL CORTEX 295, 297 (2000). 
 83 Preidt, supra note 80. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 RALPH K. JONES & JOHN H. LACEY, MID-AM. RESEARCH INST OF NEW ENGLAND, STATE 
OF KNOWLEDGE OF ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING: RESEARCH ON REPEAT DWI OFFENDERS 18 
(U.S. Dept. of Trans., Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. Feb. 2000), available at http://ntl. 
bts.gov/lib/7000/7900/7901/dwioffend.pdf. 
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aggressive and hostile.88  They are considered to be sensation-seekers and have 
relatively low levels of responsible values and parental compatibility.89  
Furthermore, many offenders share the same demographics.  Repeat offenders 
are typically male and are usually under the age of forty.90  They are most commonly 
white, have low income, and are unmarried.91  Most of these offenders are not 
educated past high school and are employed in blue-collar occupations.92  Many of 
these offenders have alcohol problems and commonly suffer from alcohol 
addiction.93  
At its least intrusive, the statute forces offenders to publicly admit they 
committed a crime.  At its most bullish, the statute forces people to communicate 
personal aspects of their lives.  The Court’s duty is to interpret the Constitution, not 
to apply a balancing test of abasement.  If it continues with such an analysis, these 
studies will begin to weigh heavily.  The sandbags of justice will tilt such a scale in 
favor of the individual.   
B.  Ohio’s Statute Must Pass Strict Scrutiny 
As discussed earlier, legislation that infringes upon the First Amendment must 
pass strict scrutiny.94  In the alternative, probation conditions are generally 
scrutinized using rational basis review.95  At first glance, the special license plate 
seems to present somewhat of a legal hybrid as it is both a probation condition and 
legislation.  After a closer examination, however, the answer of what level of 
scrutiny to apply becomes clear.   
The scarlet letter is a condition of probation, but it is not a product of judicial 
innovation.  The statute makes the special license plate a condition for all its 
offenders and forces the judge to acquiesce.96  Therefore, the nature of the special 
license requirement plate is legislative.  As the Court discussed in Carolene,97 
because this legislation is in conflict with the First Amendment, it must pass strict 
scrutiny.98 The compulsion of one offender to speak is but a whisper to the 
thunderous roar of every offender.  Such amplification distorts the tranquility of 
society and drowns out the chiming bells of civil liberty.   
Interestingly, even Goldschmitt supports this proposition.  In that case, the court 
seemed skeptical of legislative required scarlet letter punishments.  It also admitted 
                                                          
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.  
 95 See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
 96 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4503.231(A) (West 2010). 
 97 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n. 10 (1938). 
 98 See id. (when legislation violates one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is subject 
to a heightened standard of review).  See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). 
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that if the condition were imposed against all offenders it would be examined more 
rigorously.99  
We would be quicker to accept his argument if we could be persuaded 
that any of the judges felt duty bound by local custom or rule to require 
the sticker despite their personal desire to the contrary.  However, this 
obviously is not the case since half the local judiciary disdain the use of 
the sticker.  While we are skeptical of special probation conditions 
imposed across-the-board, as opposed to being tailored to the needs and 
circumstances of the individual probationer, we cannot say that a judge 
may not impose a special condition of probation any time he or she 
chooses if that special condition otherwise is lawful. 
Some commentators have argued that all probation conditions that compel 
speech or force an ideology should have to pass strict scrutiny.100  This Note does not 
go so far.  Rather, this Note suggests that when a statute compels speech it must pass 
strict scrutiny regardless of the nature of its aim.  This keeps precedent intact, and 
respects the role of judicial discretion in sentencing.   
A critic might argue that the Ohio statute does not necessarily violate the First 
Amendment on its face but is only a collateral consequence of probation.  Still yet, 
this does not necessitate rational basis review.  One Supreme Court case, in 
particular, indicated the dangers of engaging in rationale basis review when a state 
statute implicates an individual’s First Amendment rights.  In Beauharnais v. 
Illinois, the petitioner was convicted under a criminal libel statute.101  Instead of 
determining whether the statute violated the First Amendment, the Court applied 
rational basis review under a Fourteenth Amendment analysis.102  
In dissent, Justice Black severely criticized the Court.  Justice Black stated that 
the First Amendment enjoys greater protection than other civil liberties and argued 
that the majority’s holding “degraded the First Amendment freedoms to the rational 
basis level [ . . . ] leav[ing] the rights of assembly, petition, speech and press almost 
completely at the mercy of state legislative, executive and judicial agencies.”103 The 
Beauharnais decision has been widely criticized 104 and is no longer considered to be 
the Court’s view on the First Amendment.105   
                                                          
 99 Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
 100 Jaimy M. Levine, “Join the Sierra Club!”: Imposition of Ideology as a Condition of 
Probation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1888-89 (1994).  Levine argues that an ideology-related 
condition of probation should be imposed only when it can pass strict scrutiny.  
 101 Beauharnais v. Ilinois, 343 U.S. 250, 252 (1951).   
 102 Id. at 262 (holding that criminal libel legislation for the sake of public safety must be 
upheld “provided it is not unrelated to the problem and not forbidden by some explicit 
limitation to the State’s power”). 
 103 Id. at 269-270 (Black, J., dissenting).  
 104 See e.g., United States v. Handler, 383 F. Supp. 1267 (1974). (“While the Supreme 
Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois in a 5-4 decision upheld a state’s power to punish group libel, 
this Court agrees with the Tollett court that ‘a strong argument may be made that there 
remains little constitutional vitality to criminal libel law.’” (internal citation omitted) (citing 
Tollet v. United States, 485 F.2d. 1087, 1094 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that a statute that 
punished defamatory words written on the outside of envelopes or on postcards violated the 
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It is ironic that the right to speak would have lip service paid to it, yet that is what 
rational basis review would allow for.106  Nearly any infringement of an individual’s 
right to freedom of speech would be permitted as long as a reasonable person could 
find it relates to the goals of probation.  Such a low standard tells those on probation 
that they basically have no liberty under the First Amendment at all.107   
The First Amendment is not a hollow protection but a constitutional fortress able 
to withstand the siege of free speech.  The Fourteenth Amendment no longer acts as 
a Trojan horse for rational basis to breach these walls.108  While rational basis is a 
valid exercise of review of judicially-crafted probation conditions, it is improper to 
apply to it a First Amendment statutory violation.  Here, the statute eliminates 
judicial discretion and infringes upon a fundamental right.  Therefore, the Ohio 
statute must pass strict scrutiny, not merely rational basis review. 
C.  Ohio’s Interest is Legitimate but Not Compelling 
Probation conditions are circumscribed by constitutional considerations.  
Therefore, the state’s interest in the particular condition must adhere to the 
Constitution and be in furtherance of legitimate interests.  Under strict scrutiny, these 
interests must be more than just legitimate; they must be compelling.   
The state’s interest can be broadly defined as highway safety.  Through a more 
narrow lens, the statute attempts to meet the traditional goal of scarlet letter 
punishment; deterrence.109  The statute also purports to make offenders more easily 
identifiable to law enforcement.110  Additionally, the special license plate is a 
probation condition and therefore must attempt to meet the goals of probation.  
Under Ohio law, those goals are rehabilitation and reformation.111   
                                                          
First Amendment because it failed to pass strict scrutiny))). For further discussion, see Kelly, 
supra note 17, at 851-54. 
 105 See e.g., Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 n. 5 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., concurring) (noting that “it is now doubtful that the [Beauharnais] 
decision still represents the views of the Court”); see also Kelly, supra note 17, at 851-54. 
 106 Applying rational basis review to the First Amendment leaves “the rights of assembly, 
petition, speech and press almost completely at the mercy of state legislative, executive and 
judicial agencies.” Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 269-70 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 107 Probationers have “conditional liberty.” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) 
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). They retain a higher degree of 
liberty than those who are incarcerated but are still afforded basic constitutional rights.  
 108 In Homer’s epic, Odysseus presented a wooden horse as a gift to the Trojans. Inside the 
horse, Greek soldiers hid waiting to enter the city. Once inside the city walls, the soldiers 
opened the gates for the rest of the army, who conquered the city of Troy. HOMER (attr.), THE 
ODYSSEY 8.552-584 (Bernard Knox ed., Robert Fagles trans., Penguin 2006). 
 109 Scarlet letter punishments in the colonial era were meant primarily to deter, not to 
rehabilitate criminals. Due to their theology, those in favor of the punishments “placed little 
faith in the possibility of reform.” ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 52-53. 
 110 Bob Dyer, Dyer Streets: DUI plates are another Ohio Flop, AKRON BEACON J., (June 
19, 2009, 2:30 AM), http://www.ohio.com/news/48584482.html. 
 111 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02(C)(1) (West 2010); see also Ohio v. Livingston, 
372 N.E.2d 1335, 1336 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (explaining a condition of probation must be 
related to the future criminality of the offender). 
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1.  The Special License Plates Fail to Deter. 
Ohio attempts to deter drunk driving through shame.  The special license plate, 
like most scarlet letter punishments, is meant to act as both a specific and general 
deterrence.112  Specific deterrence is aimed to prevent the particular offender from 
repeating his crime.113  General deterrence is meant to discourage other citizens from 
ever committing the offense.114  In theory, the license plates will prevent drinking 
and driving by both the offender and would-be offenders through the element of 
shame.   
a.  Scarlet Letter Punishments Are No Longer Effective  
In the past, scarlet letter punishments were thought to have served effectively as 
a deterrent because people lived in cohesive communities where public opinion was 
a relevant factor in obeying law.115  Today, communities are larger and much more 
diverse.116  In the public sphere, diversity does not necessarily breed apathy, but it is 
a spawning ground for different concepts of crime and justice.    
For instance, during the Vietnam War, a draft dodger’s peers might consider him 
a hero, not a criminal.  Inner city high school students might applaud a teenager for 
stealing a car, not condemn him.117  Bernie Goetz and the 1984 New York City 
subway shootings provide a concrete and striking example of this concept.118  
Modern society’s varied attitudes make it impossible for punishments to elicit shame 
from all offenders.  To be sure, some offenders could potentially respond to shame 
but this is certainly not an all-encompassing principle.  For the most part, deterrence 
can no longer be achieved through scarlet letter conditions given the variance in 
values and public opinion.119  
Some argue that even though there is an absence of optimal conditions for shame 
in America, it is still an effective means to achieve deterrence when coupled with 
regular sanctions.120  This argument is problematic for a number of reasons.  To 
                                                          
 112 JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 34-36 (5th ed. 2009). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 52. 
 116 Jan Hoffman, Crime and Punishment: Shame Gains Popularity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
1997, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/16/us/crime-and-punishment-shame-
gains-popularity.html. 
 117  These examples appear in Hoffman’s article. Hoffman, supra note 116. 
 118  IN AN ACT OF VIGILANTE JUSTICE, GOETZ SHOT A GROUP OF TEEN-AGERS HE 
BELIEVED WERE GOING TO ROB HIM. HE RECEIVED AN OUT POURING OF SUPPORT 
AFTER HIS ACTIONS. SOME OFFERED TO PAY HIS LEGAL FEES AND BELIEVED HE 
SHOULD RUN FOR MAYOR.  SUZANNE DALEY, MAN TELLS POLICE HE SHOT YOUTHS IN 
SUBWAY TRAIN, N.Y. TIMES, JAN 1. 1985, AVAILABLE AT 
HTTP://WWW.NYTIMES.COM/1985/01/01/NYREGION/MAN-TELLS-POLICE-HE-SHOT-
YOUTHS-IN-SUBWAY-TRAIN.HTML.   
 119 Hoffman, supra note 116.  
 120 See J. BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 86 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
1989) (arguing that shame can reduce crime more effectively than punishment alone). 
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begin, it implies that regular punishments and probation conditions are insufficient 
by themselves.  If this concept was thought to be effective there is no reason for it to 
only apply to drinking and driving.  Taking this to its logical end, all punishments 
should be coupled with shaming.  This is obviously undesirable and nonsensical in 
modern society. 
Next, this argument essentially permits the destruction of the Bill of Rights to 
accomplish deterrence.  Drawing a line between what is permissible shame and what 
is a violation of the First Amendment as well as the right to privacy would lead to 
confusion in criminal law and tyranny in an otherwise free society.  Those on 
probation have restricted freedom, but they do not forfeit all freedom.121 
b.  Special License Plates Lead to Unjust Results 
The special license plates fail to deter because they inevitably lead to unequal 
and unfair results.  The sanction can be applied to someone who did not even 
commit an offense.122  The Goldschmitt court explained that it upheld the 
“CONVICTED DUI” bumper sticker sanction because innocent persons would not 
be punished by it.123  The bumper sticker contained a Velcro strip that enabled the 
message to be removed for persons who might drive the vehicle other than the 
offender.124  
Unlike the probation condition in Goldschmitt, the special license plate required 
under Ohio law cannot be removed or obstructed.125  In a one-car family, each 
member of the family is forced to drive with the special license plate.126  The 
sanction may force people to confess to a crime they have not committed.  A law that 
brands a person as criminal without violating the law will not accomplish deterrence; 
it will only lead to dismay with the present system of injustice. 
A critic might argue that the fact that family members may have to bear some of 
the brunt of the sentence is a harsh collateral consequence of the crime and, in that 
sense, does act as an effective deterrent.  It is irrational, however, to subject the 
innocent to probation conditions of the guilty.  By the same token, the diffusion of 
the punishment can also carry with it a diffusion of accountability.  For the offender 
to be deterred, he must be held accountable, not others.   
c.  Special License Plates Fail Due to Lack of Enforcement 
The special license plates are an ineffective means of deterrence because they are 
not properly enforced or respected by the courts.  Some judges often refuse to order 
the plates because they personally believe that they are ineffective.127  Also, many 
                                                          
 121 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987). 
 122 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4503.231(A) (West 2010). See also Goldschmitt v. Florida, 
490 So. 2d. 123, 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
 123 Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 126. 
 124 Id. 
 125 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4503.231(A) (West 2010). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Elder, supra note 11.  Dayton, Ohio Municipal Judge John S. Pickrel stated that he 
“doesn’t think the DUI license plates are very effective, so he doesn’t order them very often.” 
He also said “discretion is necessary to protect the innocent.” 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss4/10
2011] HAVE YOU BEEN DRINKING TONIGHT MS. PRYNNE? 761 
 
first time offenders who are guilty of a high-tier OVI are able to circumvent the 
punishment by pleading no contest.  Fairfield, Ohio Municipal Judge Joyce 
Campbell explained, “They are not acknowledging that it’s a 0.17 (blood alcohol 
content), but they are acknowledging that they were driving under the influence . . . 
That happens quite a bit.”128  Others are able to delay their hearing so that by the 
time they are sentenced the license suspension will have been served.129  
David Diroll, the Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission’s executive director, 
maintains that the law still has an effect because it makes defendants more likely to 
accept plea deals that they otherwise might not want to take.130  But by minimizing 
the effect, the special license plate loses its purpose.  Deterrence is sacrificed to 
leverage guilt.  It seems ironic if not plain contradictory that an interest in deterring 
the crime would result in securing more convictions.  In settling for the special 
license plate as a bargaining chip in plea negotiations, the justification for the 
condition becomes meaningless.   
2.  The Attempt to Identify Offenders is Counterproductive 
Theoretically, a bright yellow license plate would make it easier for law 
enforcement to find the vehicle on the road and make sure that the driver is 
following the law.  One argument against this proposition is that it completely rebuts 
the presumption of innocence.  Moreover, law enforcement will be prone to 
investigate vehicles with the special license plate even though the driver may be 
following the laws of the road.  In doing so, police could neglect to investigate other 
drivers who are actually breaking the law. 
Interestingly, these license plates may be resulting in unfair treatment of visitors 
from other states.  The Ohio restricted license plate has a yellow backdrop.131  New 
York’s “Empire Gold” plate,132 Alaska’s “The Last Frontier” plate,133 and Oregon’s 
“Amateur Ham Radio” license plate,134 all have this yellow background.  These 
license plates all look similar and, especially at night, are hard to tell apart.  A New 
York driver described her concern over the similarities as follows, “I became very 
self-conscious of this license plate while I drove back to New York, and breathed a 
sigh of relief when I crossed the PA state line!”135  Both law enforcement and other 
drivers on the road might unfairly prejudice drivers from other states with yellow 
                                                          
 128 Sheila McLaughlin, Driving Without Shame, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 27, 2005, at 
A1.  
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 § 4503.231(A). 
 132 NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, http://www.nydmv.state.ny.us/ 
cplates.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
 133 ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION: DIVISION OF MOTOR 
VEHICLES, http://doa.alaska.gov/dmv/plates/index.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
 134 OREGON DMV, http://www.oregon.gov/ODOT/DMV/vehicle/plateregular.html (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
 135 Your Comments: NY’s new License Plates Resemble Ohio’s Drunk-Driver Plates, THE 
POST STANDARD (Syracuse), July 19, 2010, 
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2010/07/your commentsnysnewlicense.html. 
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license plates.  This discrimination creates a climate of paranoia and concern that 
should not be borne by people operating motor vehicles.   
3.  The Special License Plates Do Not Rehabilitate Offenders. 
Although a condition may attempt to protect the community through the 
punishment of the offender, this does not by itself justify the condition.136  Under 
Ohio law, probation conditions must aim to rehabilitate the offender.137  Therefore, 
the special license plate must be in furtherance of restoring the probationer to a law-
abiding life and to becoming a productive member of society. 
a.  Scarlet Letter Punishments Were Never Meant to Rehabilitate 
In Puritan society, scarlet letter punishments were aimed at the suppression of 
immorality, not the betterment of the individual.138  Puritan law focused on the 
criminal as being an inherent sinner who could not be redeemed through society.139  
Modern criminal law emanated from Puritan law, but now focuses on the criminal as 
being a threat to society.140  This evolution of the law ultimately led to including 
rehabilitation as a fundamental goal.141  The special license plates are a regression 
from this modern concept.  The license plates do not help re-assimilate the offender 
back into society.  In contrast, they attempt to ostracize the offender. 
Some believe the revival of shaming is necessary because rehabilitation is not 
realistic.142  Yet, frustration with a system is not a reason for abandonment of a 
virtue.  Furthermore, some of the most passionate anti-DUI organizations argue that 
special license plates should not be applied to offenders because it only serves to 
punish and does not improve highway safety.  According to Katherine Kovacich, 
regional administrator for MADD in the Pacific Northwest, Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving “is not into shunning” convicted DUI offenders and opposes the special 
license plates and supports the use of interlocks.143  The special license plates do 
nothing to rehabilitate the offender but are only an added punishment. 
                                                          
 136 People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Ill. 1997). 
 137 Ohio v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1336 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (explaining a 
condition of probation must be related to the future criminality of the offender). 
 138 William E. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary 
Era: An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 461 (1967). 
 139 Id. at 466. 
 140 Id. at 462. 
 141 Id. at 460-61; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(a) (West 2010) (Sentencing judges shall 
make imprisonment decisions “recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of 
promoting correction and rehabilitation.”). 
 142 See Tony M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
1880, 1884 (1991); see also O’Hara Kelly, supra note 17, at 783-84 (“Politicians, who are 
quick to pick up on the public’s dissatisfaction, have fed the frenzy. Looking for a quick fix 
they have implanted mandatory sentencing statutes . . . In this changing political climate, 
judges also are showing their exasperation with the criminal justice system. Some trial courts 
are creating ‘shaming’ probation conditions.”). 
 143 In-Car Breathalyzers, MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING (MADD), http://www.madd. 
org/drunk-driving/campaign/ignition-interlock.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
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Many argue that the fact the special license plate is punitive does not disqualify it 
as legitimate.  In fact, many courts have held that “rehabilitation and punishment are 
not mutually exclusive ideas.”144  A probation condition that is meant to serve a 
rehabilitative purpose can also collaterally serve a punitive purpose.  These courts, 
however, fall victim to a conceptually similar problem; rehabilitation and 
punishment are not mutually inclusive.  Courts are quick to find the condition as 
punitive and conclude that it is also rehabilitative.145  While it is true that some 
conditions could be rehabilitative and punitive, Ohio’s special license plate achieves 
the latter at the expense of the former.   
b.  The Sanction is Overbroad and Will Have Unintended Consequences 
The elimination of judicial discretion in administering the special license plates 
plays a large role in the condition’s failure to rehabilitate offenders.  The scarlet 
letter sanction is meant to subject the individual to ridicule within the community.  A 
playground mentality applied to a probation condition is problematic because it is 
too hard to predict how the condition will affect the offender.146  For instance, in 
People v.  Meyer,147 the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault.  As a 
condition of his probation he was forced to maintain a sign outside of his house that 
read: “Warning! A Violent Felon lives here Enter at your own Risk.”148  On appeal, 
the court found that the probation condition was unreasonable because there could be 
unintended and undesirable consequences.149  It should be noted that the defendant 
suffered from depression and other stresses.150  A psychiatrist testified that the 
defendant would likely perceive behavior as threatening that the average person 
would not.151  In a case such as this, evidence of this nature could be used to mitigate 
the sentence.  If the punishment were a legislative requirement, however, individual 
circumstances would not be taken into account. 
June Tangney, a professor of psychology at George Mason University, has 
studied over 10,000 people to distinguish feelings of shame and guilt.152  She has 
                                                          
 144 See O’Hara Kelly, supra note 17, at 793-94. 
 145 Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652, 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). The Lindsay court 
deferred to the trial court’s judgment when it held that a condition requiring a DUI offender to 
pay for a newspaper advertisement containing his mug shot was punitive as well as 
rehabilitative. See also Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
The Goldschmitt court stated it was unable to say that the condition was without any sufficient 
foundation to be considered rehabilitative but did not engage in any real analysis. See O’Hara 
Kelly, supra note 17, at 793-95 for further discussion. 
 146 Hoffman, supra note 116 (quoting Professor Massaro). 
 147 People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Ill. 1997). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 320. See also Tennessee v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that 
a shaming sign was unreasonable because compliance with the condition would have 
consequences that would be unforeseen and unpredictable). 
 150 Meyer, 689 N.E.2d at 316.  
 151 Id. 
 152 Hoffman, supra note 116. 
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concluded that guilt can lead to reformation, but feelings of shame can have the 
opposite effect.153  Particularly, when shaming penalties are crudely applied, they 
have potential to backfire.154  People who are meant to feel shame and be deterred 
might blame others and react poorly.155  The special license plate is a shaming 
penalty that is mandated across the board for all offenders.  A sanction that could 
create such adverse effects is ineffective in terms of rehabilitation and ridiculous in 
terms of practicality.    
As a practical matter, the special license plate could adversely affect the 
offender’s ability to engage in activities having no possible relationship to future 
criminality.  The stigma of the license plate could affect job prospects, social 
relationships, and general public opinion.  In this sense, the probation condition is 
entirely too broad.  When a probation condition requires the waiver of constitutional 
rights, it becomes more important that it be narrowly drawn.156  In reality, there is no 
way for a public admonishment to be narrowly applied to a specific offense.  Any 
aim at rehabilitation is defeated because the offender becomes the target of rebuke.   
A more abstract approach can also be taken to emphasize the unintended 
consequences of the special license plate.  The special license plate obstructs 
freedom of speech and expression into the marketplace of ideas, resulting in harm to 
both the individual and society.  The marketplace of ideas theory holds that the free 
trade of ideas is the best test of truth as well as the wisdom of policy making.157  This 
theory was prominent in the writings of John Stuart Mill.158 Mill believed that man is 
a rational being and is capable of distinguishing good choices from bad choices.159  
In order to be able to exercise this reason correctly, however, the individual must 
have unlimited access to the ideas of his fellow man in a “free and open 
encounter.”160  In this concept, transparent public discourse is also inimical to 
democratic government.161  The special license plate serves to silence the 
probationer’s true voice in the public arena.  As a result, it chills the free flow of 
expression into the market place of ideas and fails the test of truth.  As Justice 
Holmes stated in his dissent in Abrams v. United States: 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundation of 
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
                                                          
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id.  
 156 People v. Garcia , 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 340, 342 (Cal Ct. App. 1993). 
 157 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting). 
 158 Jill Gordon, John Stuart Mill and the “Marketplace of Ideas,” 23 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 
235, 236 (1997). 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 See id. See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (Brandeis, J. concurring). 
“The greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; 
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.” 
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trade in ideas . . . that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.  That at 
any rate is the theory of our Constitution.162 
Furthermore, it is always important to be mindful of trends in the law and the 
impact of sentences.   The effects of progressive as well as regressive decisions and 
legislation are rarely felt in a vacuum.  The fabric of the law of tomorrow is weaved 
on today’s legislative and judicial loom.   
In People v. Johnson, the defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence 
of alcohol.163 She was placed on probation provided that she would make a public 
apology in the newspaper alongside her booking picture.164  On appeal, the district 
court held that the condition was adverse to rehabilitation and vacated the order.  
Judge Green filed a concurring opinion that read, “to uphold the condition imposed 
here would encourage other courts to impose other unusual, dramatic conditions, and 
the proliferation of these types of conditions would cause problems of a greater 
magnitude than their propensity to rehabilitate.”165  The impact of Ohio’s special 
license plate is not a victory for alternative sentencing but sends a message 
throughout the law that rehabilitation can be replaced with the pillory.   
D.  The Ignition Interlock is a Less Burdensome Alternative. 
The state must show that there are no less burdensome means to achieve its 
end.166 In fact, the state has the burden of showing that its interest is being 
accomplished by the least “speech restrictive” means.167  The ignition interlock 
(“interlock”) is an alternative that accomplishes the state’s interest in safety while 
keeping the First Amendment intact. 
The interlock is a device that checks the driver’s blood alcohol content before the 
ignition of the automobile will start.168  The driver must blow into the device and is 
prevented from starting the car if the device detects blood alcohol content above 
.02.169  Most notably, the interlock does not force the offender to be a courier of any 
message.  Other states are starting to incorporate interlock devices into their laws 
                                                          
 162 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 163 People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1360-61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 1363 (Green, P.J. specially concurring). See also People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 
315, 319 (Ill. 1997). 
 166 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1977). “The breadth of legislative 
abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic 
purpose.”  
 167 Id. at 716. 
 168 Ignition Interlock Device, IGNITONINTERLOCKDEVICE.ORG, http://www.ignitioninterlock 
device.org (last visited Dec. 12, 2010). 
 169 Id. 
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because of these advantages.170  Many of these states are going as far as making the 
device mandatory for all drinking and driving offenses.171  Because of these trends, 
the interlock is often considered “the future of highway safety.”172 
In Ohio, the interlock device is required for a second offense within six years and 
subsequent offenses.173  It follows that in many cases, the interlock and the special 
license requirement often overlap.174  In these instances, the special license plate 
serves only as an added punishment and should not be used.  Unlike the special 
license plates, the inter-lock device is not required for first time offenders convicted 
of a “high-tier” OVI.175  In these instances, the interlock should, and constitutional 
considerations demand that, it replace the special license plate.   
1.  The Effectiveness of the Interlock  
When the state’s interest is legitimate, it becomes important that alternatives be 
effective.  The state’s interest in safety should not be thrown out along with the 
unconstitutional bath water.  A discussion of the merits of the device as an 
alternative can again begin with deterrence. 
a.  Deterrence  
The interlock is in and of itself a deterrent.176  It prevents the drinker from 
becoming a driver.  The special license plates are argued to serve as a deterrent 
because they humiliate people into not drinking and driving.  Unfortunately, 
humiliation will not always correlate to wise decision-making.177  The interlock does 
not depend on emotion but relies on efficiency.  Technology is indifferent to 
circumstance and not subject to caprice.  It follows that the interlock is a more 
effective deterrent than the special license plates.    
A critic might argue that the special license plate is more effective because the 
shaming element of the license plate prevents an individual from choosing to drink 
                                                          
 170 Only three states currently do not use ignition interlock devices at all for DUI offenders: 
Alabama, South Dakota, and Vermont. State Ignition Interlock Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE 
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13558 (last updated Oct. 2010). 
 171 Currently, eleven states require interlock devices for all offenders and seven others 
require them for repeat offenders or those convicted of a “high tier” DUI. Anne Teigen & 
Melissa Savage, Last Call: Lawmakers Hope New Technology Could Mean the End to 
Drunken Driving, NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURES, (Dec. 2009), 
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid =19170. See also H.B. 78, 128th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 
2009). An amendment to make the ignition interlock mandatory for all OVI offenses has been 
proposed in Ohio but has never become law. 
 172  See Joseph Marutollo, No Second Chances: Leandra’s Law and Mandatory Alcohol 
Ignition Interlocks for First-Time Drunk Driving Offenders, 30 PACE L. REV. 1090, 1107 
(2010). 
 173 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4510.13(A)(5)(d)(i) (West 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4511.191(C)(1)(c). 
 174 Id. 
 175 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4503.231(A) (West 2010). 
 176 See Ignition Interlock Device, supra note 168. 
 177 See supra Part III.C.1. 
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and drive after the probation sentence is over.  On the contrary, studies have shown 
that interlocks are more effective than special license plates at reducing recidivism.  
According to a recent national study, the interlock has led to a 40-95% reduction in 
conviction rates of people who were previously arrested for DUI.178  Studies closer to 
home have also indicated promising results.  An Ohio study found that “recidivism 
rates were three times higher for offenders who received a license suspension 
compared with offenders placed in an interlock group.”179  After thirty months, only 
1.5% of the Ohio interlock subjects were rearrested compared to 16.1% of the non-
interlock group.180 
As previously discussed, one of the reasons special license plates fail to deter is 
because they are implemented into diverse communities in which a person’s public 
opinion is not as dominant as in a close-knit society.181  Although the device is not 
considered nor meant to be punitive, the interlock might solve this problem.182  
Presumably, a passenger in another’s car has a more intimate relationship with the 
driver than the rest of society.  If the driver was going to be “shamed” into 
compliance with the law, it is likely that having to use the interlock device to start 
the car in the presence of a passenger would better serve that purpose.  The restricted 
license plate would not necessarily cause the same embarrassment in front of a 
passenger, because it is not a constant presence within the car. 
b.  Identification 
Identifying the former offender is, for the most part, no longer necessary with the 
interlock.  Presumably, if the car is on the road, the driver will not be under the 
influence of alcohol.183  The interlock, however, has taken additional measures to 
prevent people from attempting to circumvent the probation condition.  The interlock 
requires “running retests” which require the driver to breathe into the device at 
regular intervals.184  Such tests prevent the driver from having a sober person start 
the car.  If a driver does fail one of these retests the vehicle’s horn will honk and/or 
the lights will begin to flash to alert law enforcement.185  The device must also be 
                                                          
 178 Paul R. Marques et al., Alcohol Ignition Interlock Devices I: Position Paper, Prepared 
for: INT’L COUNCIL ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS & TRAFFIC SAFETY, 10 (2001), 
http://www.icadts.org/ reports/Alcohol/InterlockReport.pdf. 
 179 Andrew Fulkerson, The Ignition Interlock System: An Evidentiary Tool Becomes a 
Sentencing Element, AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE, Winter 2003, at 21. 
 180 Id. 
 181 See infra Part II.A.; Hoffman, supra note 116.  
 182 W.J. Rauch, E.M. Ahlin & M.M. Berlin, Do Legal Barriers Favor an Administrative 
Ignition Interlock License Restriction Program or a Judicial Program? A Legal Review 
Update, 7th Annual International Ignition Interlock Symposium (Oct. 22-26, 2006), 
http://www.pire.org/interlocksymposium/papers/LegalReviewRauch.pdf. 
 183 See Ignition Interlock Device, supra note 168. 
 184 Andrew Fulkerson, Blow and Go: The Breath-Analyzed Ignition Interlock Device as a 
Technological Response to DWI, 29 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 219, 223 (2003). 
 185 Id. 
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reset by the interlock company, which can lead to further sanctions.186  These 
measures most assuredly identify drunken drivers better than playing a game of “go-
fish” with yellow license plates.  The interlock, however, is not intended to create an 
outcast.  Rather, the interlock intends to create a driver that complies with the laws 
of the road.   
c.  Rehabilitation 
At first glance, it may seem that the interlock is designed as a preventive measure 
rather than a rehabilitative construct.  The interlock, however, works to successfully 
integrate an OVI offender back into society while forcing him to obey the laws while 
driving.  Research from Westat’s Center for Studies on Alcohol, Substance Abuse 
indicates that many first-time offenders arrested for drinking and driving have driven 
while intoxicated more than eighty-seven times before their first arrest.187  Such 
behavior is characterized as “learning to drink and drive.”188  
 The interlock forces the offender to break such behavioral habits by learning to 
drink without driving.  If the offender drives, there is no way to drive back after 
drinking.  The interlock serves to make the OVI offenders independent of their 
vehicles after drinking and get in law conforming patterns of using alternate forms of 
transportation. 
2.  Burdens of the Interlock 
Potential alternatives must, of course, be less burdensome than the state’s means.  
The cost of the device is argued to be a burden that many are unable or unwilling to 
carry.  Additionally, statutes that require the interlock can have their own 
constitutional problems.  If the interlock removes the special license plate for certain 
offenses, or even becomes mandatory for all OVI offenses, these burdens have 
potential to become exacerbated.   
a.  Cost of the Interlock 
The most common criticism of the interlock is that it is too costly and many 
offenders will not be able to afford to install it.  Additionally, many feel that state 
penalties and profit have long been pals.  It is no surprise then, that some argue that 
the interlock is yet another example of pork-barrel spending.189  
                                                          
 186 If the court receives notice that the device prevented the offender from starting the 
motor vehicle because device indicated the presence of alcohol in the offender’s breath the 
court may increase the period of suspension or revoke the offender’s driving privileges 
altogether. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4510.13(A)(10) (West 2010).  In addition, if a driver is 
able to tamper with the device and start his car, this gives an officer probable cause to arrest a 
driver for DUI.  City of Akron v. Kirby, 681 N.E.2d 444, 451-452 (Ohio App. 1996). 
 187 See Janet Dewey-Kollen & Angela Downes, Shattering Misconceptions About First-
Time Drunk Driving Offenders, 42 PROSECUTOR 14, 14 (2008). 
 188 Id. 
 189 After calculating the monthly fees, about $27 million a year is going to a half-dozen 
private companies authorized to install the instruments in Illinois where first-time offenders 
are mandated or induced to have the interlock device.  What if Interlocks Were Installed in 
Every Car?, INTERLOCK FACTS (Feb. 8, 2009), http://interlockfacts.com/news-
item.cfm?id=430. 
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Currently, there is an installation fee between forty and sixty-five dollars for the 
device.190  Once installed, the device is leased on a monthly basis at a cost of sixty to 
seventy dollars.191  It is true that the cost of the interlock is greater than the special 
license plate.192  Dignity, however, may be regarded as a more precious commodity 
than the bank account.   As a practical matter, Ohio has created a plan to help with 
the cost.193 
Ohio has created a special court project fund for indigent drivers.194  Under this 
plan, OVI offenders will be charged an additional two dollars and fifty cents in court 
costs to be deposited into the fund for indigent offenders.195  Each manufacturer of 
the device must also pay a fee of five percent of its net profit to the fund.196  
Manufacturers must participate in this program to receive a license to register the 
devices.  This is clearly not an example of the rich getting richer while the poor get 
poorer.  Instead, this is progressive legislation to cure an epidemic in society.  The 
profit is not exclusive to the companies. 
When a mandatory interlock statute was proposed in Ohio, the legislature 
discussed the possible consequences of making the interlock mandatory for all OVI 
offenses.  The fiscal staff was unable to determine the effect a requirement for all 
OVI offenses would have.197  It is too difficult to estimate how many potential 
offenders would be considered indigent.198  One possible solution is to limit the use 
of the interlock to all instances in which the special license plate is used.  If the fund 
proves insufficient, Ohio could simply require that the offender is responsible for all 
costs as many other states have done with little legal opposition.199  
b.  Constitutional Considerations 
Most courts have found the use of the interlock and statutes requiring it to be 
constitutional.200  A Pennsylvania statute, however, has proven that interlock statutes 
                                                          
 190 H.B. 78, 128th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009) Fiscal Note (May 13, 2009).  
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4510.45(B) and (C) (West 2010). 
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 197 H.B. 78, 128th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009) Fiscal Note (May 13, 2009). 
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 199  Under Pennsylvania law, the individual required to have the interlock will bear all the 
costs under this statute. If an individual cannot afford the interlock device offenders must 
serve an additional year suspension.  Individuals, whose income is below 200% of the poverty 
level, may apply for a hardship exemption.  The hardship exemption still requires the 
individual to have the interlock installed in one vehicle. Individuals who own no vehicle will 
be able to comply with the requirement by having an ignition interlock vendor certify that they 
own no vehicles and apply for the interlock license.  75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3805 (West. 
2010).  New York also has a mandatory interlock law for first a time offender, which requires 
the offender to bear the entire cost.  N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193(1)(c) (McKinney 2010). 
 200 Rauch et al., supra note 182.  
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011
770 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:755 
 
are not impervious to constitutional problems.  For a second or subsequence offense, 
the statute mandated that interlock devices be installed on each motor vehicle owned 
by the offender.201 Additionally, the statute required that the court must certify that 
the device has been installed before driving privileges could be reinstated.202 
In Commonwealth  v. Mockaitis, the defendant was convicted of his second DUI 
offense.203  The defendant appealed the installation of the interlock and argued that it 
violated the separation of powers doctrine.204  The statute required the court to certify 
the installation of the interlock, a function reserved to an executive authority.205  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed that the statute, as written, violated the 
separation of powers.206  
Ohio has removed such a potential constitutional violation through careful 
statutory construction.  Under Ohio law, the Department of Public Safety has the 
responsibility to check and approve the certification of the interlock rather than the 
judiciary.207  Because the court orders the device and an executive agency has 
responsibility to approve certification, there is no violation of the separation of 
powers.   
The same Pennsylvania statute was challenged on grounds of the Equal 
Protection clause of the 14th Amendment.208  In Lebanon Cnty. v. Riggs,209 the 
defendant argued that the statutory requirement, that he install an interlock on all 
vehicles he owned, created an unequal class of drivers.  The court agreed that the 
statue was unconstitutional as it treated drivers who owned vehicles differently from 
drivers who leased or borrowed vehicles.210  
Ohio’s law, however, is not vulnerable to an Equal Protection Clause argument.  
Ohio’s statute states that “no vehicle that may be operated pursuant to an 
immobilization waiver” can be driven without the interlock.211  Ohio’s law is based 
on the use of the vehicle not the premise of ownership.  It follows that no class of 
drivers will be treated differently. 
                                                          
 201 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7002(b) (West 2002) (repealed 2003). 
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 203 Pennsylvania v. Mockaitis, 834 A.2d 488, 492 (Pa. 2003). 
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Courts have generally been favorable to interlock programs because they protect 
the safety of the public.212  As long as statutes are written carefully they have been 
upheld.213  Ohio’s statute carefully protects the coequal branches of government and 
does not discriminate against any particular class of drivers.  There are no 
constitutional obstacles that can prevent the interlock from being less burdensome 
than Ohio’s special license plate requirement.   
Those who still argue in favor of Ohio’s Scarlet Letter Statute are willing to 
sacrifice the liberty of the First Amendment for peace of mind while driving on the 
highway.  The inherent problem with this argument is that special license plates do 
not effectively increase safety.  Even if evidence exists that shows special license 
plates slightly increase safety, the bright license plate pales in comparison to what 
the interlock device is capable of.   
 It is important to remember that the right to speak or the right to remain silent is 
not forfeited with an OVI/DUI conviction.  Some may not be interested in protecting 
the First Amendment rights of those who put others in danger, but that interest must 
be compelling.  Here, Ohio’s interest fails to meet such a standard.  There is, 
however, another option.  The interlock is an alternative to special license plates that 
those in favor of safety as well as proponents of liberty should demand.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The interlock is considered to be the future of highway safety.214  Ohio should 
look to the future in its legislation rather than turning to past injustices of the scarlet 
letter.  Today there are legal protections that were unknown to Puritan culture.  The 
weight of Ohio’s Scarlet Letter Statute can be lifted by the guaranteed liberties in the 
Constitution.  The First Amendment protects the right of OVI offenders to refrain 
from carrying the message of the special license plate.  Ohio’s statute that requires 
special license plates for OVI offenders violates the First Amendment and cannot 
pass strict scrutiny.  The interlock must replace the special license plate as a 
probation condition for OVI offenses.  Ohio’s Scarlet Letter Statute can then be 
removed.   
But there lay the embroidered letter, glittering like a lost jewel, which 
some ill-fated wanderer might pick up, and thenceforth be haunted by 
strange phantoms of guilt, sinkings of the heart, and unaccountable 
misfortune.  The stigma gone, Hester heaved a long, deep sigh, in which 
the burden of shame and anguish departed from her spirit.  O exquisite 
relief!  She had not known the weight, until she felt the freedom! 
   -Hester Prynne, after the removal of her scarlet letter.215 
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